Correcting Global Imbalances with Exchange Rate Realignment? No thanks! by Francis Cripps et al.
overty Centre P
INTERNATIONAL
The content of this page does not  necessarily reflect the official views of the
International Poverty Centre, IPEA or the United Nations Development Programme.
International Poverty Centre (IPC)
SBS – Ed. BNDES, 10º andar
70076 900  Brasilia DF  Brazil
































Annual growth rates (2 yr averages) 
   June, 2007          Number  38
Correcting Global Imbalances with
Exchange Rate Realignment?
No thanks!
by Francis Cripps; Alex Izurieta
and Terry McKinley
 1
Global financial imbalances have recently been fading from the
headlines. One reason might be the strong growth performance of
the global economy, for both developed and developing countries,
despite signs of a mild slowdown in the United States. Another reason
might be optimism about self-regulating market mechanisms, best
represented perhaps by the views of the International Monetary Fund
in the latest World Economic Outlook (April 2007, pp. 106):
The analysis in this chapter of historical episodes of large and sustained
imbalances and their reversal clearly suggests that a market-led
realignment of real exchange rates can play an important complementary
role to demand rebalancing across countries to facilitate a smooth
unwinding of external imbalances.
We cannot share, however, this optimism, particularly about the
effectiveness of exchange-rate realignment. Global imbalances are
much larger than ever before. The last instance of a widening U.S.
deficit, in the mid-1980s, could be sorted out amongst a small club
of rich countries. Yet, its correction took nearly four years, required a
30 per cent dollar devaluation and triggered a recession.
This time the current account of the U.S. is twice as large as its peak
deficit of the 1980s (as a per cent of GDP) despite a 17 per cent dollar
devaluation over the last five years. The counterpart surpluses are
widely distributed amongst both developed and developing
economies. Moreover, the size of global capital markets is many-fold
greater than in the 1980s, with the consequence that the required
currency realignment could have a major impact on the distribution
of global wealth as well as income.
Using the Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM),2 a World
Macroeconomic Model, to explore various policy scenarios, we
conclude that exchange rate realignment in the current state of the
world economy is close to a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ recipe,
favourable, at best, to the United States (assuming no retaliation
from other countries).
A real depreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the currency of its
trading partners at a rate of around five per cent per year would
cause a slowdown of the world economy from about five per cent
per year in 2006 to around two per cent in 2015. The U.S. economy
slows down only from a trend rate of growth of three per cent to
2.5 per cent by 2015. But its current account deficit is reduced from
its trend by less than one percentage point of GDP. Meanwhile, the
rate of growth elsewhere in the world is cut. For the developing
world, the reduction is from seven per cent per annum to just
above two per cent.
If real depreciation in the U.S. is accompanied by real appreciation in
the Asian region alone (Japan, China and the rest of Asia), the turn-
around of deficits and surpluses would be more significant. Japan’s
surplus would be reduced in 2015, while the surpluses of China and
Asia would evaporate (Figure 1). However, Figure 2 shows that growth
performance turns out to be much worse for Asia: there is recession in
Japan, growth plunges to nearly zero in China and slows to about
two per cent in the rest of Asia. However, the U.S. manages to regain
its trend growth of about 3 per cent in about five year.
Of course, any model is only a rough approximation to a complex
reality. So its results should be treated with caution. But it is not
difficult to identify why there are likely to be such adverse outcomes
from exchange-rate realignments. The reduction of net exports in the
regions with appreciating exchange rates weakens their income
growth; this effect reduces, in turn, their ability to import from the
regions that experience exchange-rate depreciation. The net aggregate
effect is that global income growth could be significantly slowed.
The outcome could be worse if a corresponding disruption of capital
markets causes volatility in investment.
Demand rebalancing, supported by the IMF as the complementary
remedial measure, can in principle provide a more effective and
mutually beneficial solution. The growth of domestic demand would
have to slow in the U.S. while it increased in countries with current-
account surpluses. But this would require a degree of coordinated
international efforts that is unlikely to occur as long as international
financial institutions continue to believe in the magic of market
mechanisms. They cannot acknowledge the prospect that current
mammoth global imbalances could result in an abrupt, drastic and
mutually destructive correction.
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